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Abstract 
 
The research reported in this paper was conducted under the project ‘The Social 
Impacts of Environmental Taxes: Removing Regressivity’, funded by the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation under its Programme on Environment and Social Concerns. 
The project is investigating the social implications of environmental taxes and 
charges in relation to four environmental issues – the household use of energy, water, 
and transport, and the generation of waste. This is a report of the component on the 
household use of water. 
 
The motivation for the research was an acceptance that there is a strong 
environmental case for universal water metering, particularly in southern and eastern 
England, regions that are already making unsustainable use of their water resources 
and where the situation is expected to get worse because of population shifts and 
climate change. In these regions at least, water is now a scarce resource, which 
implies that it needs to be managed. A scarce resource cannot be managed unless it is 
measured, yet water companies presently have little knowledge about how much 
water different household consumers use. Since the use of water needs to be managed, 
that implies that its use needs to be measured by metering. A further argument 
involves recognition that water has a value and that people should be encouraged to 
use it wisely. It is not easy for that message to get across when water is a free good at 
the point of use, and there is no incentive to avoid even the most gratuitous waste. 
 
There are also arguments against water metering: that it is an expensive means of 
encouraging water conservation, that it can lead to people cutting back on use that is 
essential for hygiene or medical reasons, and that its implementation can lead to 
disproportionate costs for low-income households (i.e. is regressive). The focus of this 
research is an examination of ways to design water-metering tariffs to reduce 
negative impacts on poor households. 
 
At present there are two methods of paying for water in the UK. Most households pay 
a bill based partly on a standing charge and partly on the rateable value of the 
property. The system is a hangover from the days of local authority ownership of 
water services in England and Wales. Rateable values were last assessed in 1973 and 2 
have a number of anomalies. For homes built since 1990 and for other households 
that want to, the alternative is to be metered. The households that have volunteered to 
be metered are on average smaller and in higher rateable value properties than those 
that have remained unmetered. 
 
The UK is unusual among OECD countries in that most households here are not 
metered. A recent OECD study found that water charging in England is more 
regressive and more burdensome on the poor as a proportion of their income than in 
any other country examined except Mexico (OECD 2003). It is therefore not true 
either that metering is per se more regressive than non-metered tariffs, or that the 
UK’s present system of water charging is equitable. The distributional impact 
depends on the detail of the tariff. 
 
Universal metering could be implemented in the UK through a variety of different 
tariffs, each with different distributional implications. At one end of the spectrum 
would be an equal charge (at least from a given water company – water charges 
currently vary widely by region) for all households per unit volume of water used. 
This would increase the regressivity of water charging, and most low-income 
households would be made worse off. At the other end of the spectrum universal 
metering could be made very progressive, and most low-income households could be 
made better off, by having a lower tariff for those on benefits, by giving a ‘free’ 
allowance of water to some households, or by varying the tariff by an amount related 
to Council Tax. These are some of the options explored by the research in this paper. 
All the progressive options involve on average a redistribution of income from better 
off to less well of households. 
 
Previous research conducted first by the Institute of Fiscal Studies and later by 
OXERA on the distributional implications of universal metering indicated that in 
England this would not be more regressive than the present system. However, these 
studies were severely limited by the fact that they did not have access to any data from 
a water consumption monitor that also provided data on the incomes of the 
households surveyed. They were forced to use various proxies for household income, 
with the consequence that the results obtained were rather unreliable assessments of 
the actual impact of alternative tariff designs. This project has been the first in the UK 3 
to have information, from data supplied by Anglian Water, on both household water 
consumption and on household income
i.  
 
It was found that even Anglian Water’s existing water metering tariff is less 
regressive than their unmeasured tariff based on rateable value, although it is more 
expensive than the unmeasured tariff for larger households on low incomes. The 
distributional effect of a number of alternative tariff designs was examined with three 
politically important variables in mind: the average effect on low-income households; 
the effect on high-water-using low-income households; and the overall redistributive 
effect (i.e. the transfer from richer to poorer households). The first major result of the 
research was that all the metered tariffs investigated (including the simple measure of 
extending Anglian’s present metered tariff to unmetered customers) were less 
regressive than the present tariffs.  
 
Table S.1 gives a summary of the various results found by the investigation of ten 
different tariff options, with a focus on the three politically important variables 
mentioned above. A full description of all the options, and other results from the 
analysis are reported in the paper. The various options are set out below. It should be 
noted that the results quoted are for both currently metered and RV Anglian 
customers, apart from Option 1. All results assume that there has been no demand 
reduction as a result of metering. 
 
Option 1:  Metering with existing Anglian Water tariff for (RV customers only, no 
effect on existing metered customers) 
Option 2:  Metering with the volumetric rate varying according to current 
Council Tax bands  
Option 3:  Metering with the volumetric rate varying according to stretched 
Council Tax bands  
Option 4:  Metering with standing charge varying according to stretched Council 
Tax bands 
Option 5:  Metering with a lifeline allowance of 15 m
3 per capita and an 
increased price per litre of water 
Option 6:  Metering with a lifeline allowance of 20 m
3 per capita for the first 
adult and each child and an increased price per litre of water 4 
Option 7:  Metering with an allowance varying according to Council Tax band 
Option 8:  Metering with an allowance and the variable charge varying 
according to stretched Council Tax band ratios 
Option 9:  Metering with a lifeline allowance and the charge per litre of water 
varying according to stretched Council Tax band ratios 
Option 10:  Metering with a lifeline allowance and the charge per litre of water 
varying according to current Council Tax band ratios 
Option 11:  Metering with standing charge and allowance varying according to 
Council Tax band  
 
In addition to showing, as mentioned above, that all the investigated options are 
progressive from the point of view of the lowest-income households, Table S.1 shows 
that all but one (Option 1) is also progressive for the next income group (those with 
incomes of £10-20,000). Moreover, this result was not a function of the structure of 
the Anglian Water tariff, because a similar result was obtained when one of the 
options was analysed using the Severn Trent tariff (which has no standing charge). 
The result is therefore likely to hold across all water customers, whatever their water 
company. There is therefore no basis for supposing for switching to metering will, on 
average, make low-income households worse off. All the options investigated actually 
make them better off on average, some quite substantially so. In view of the fact that 
current water charging systems are generally regressive, many would consider that a 
switch to such tariffs would give greater fairness of treatment of water customers. 
 
Table S.1:  Comparison of Results from Various Metering Tariff Options 
 
























Option 1  +0.34  8%  -0.02  15%  -0.09  17% 
Option 2  +0.67  9%  +0.39  10%  -0.14  21% 5 
Option 3  +1.09  6%  +0.81  12%  +0.36  37% 
Option 4  +0.59  9%  +0.24  15%  -0.50  33% 
Option  5  +0.31  12% +0.01  15% -0.17  25% 
Option  6  +0.39  11% +0.08  15% -0.31  26% 
Option  7  +1.48  13% +0.79  20% -1.83  57% 
Option  8  +2.20  10% +1.49  14% -3.11  43% 
Option 9  +1.16  8%  +0.93  11%  -2.00  45% 
Option  10  +0.72  12% +0.50  13% -1.19  47% 
Option  11  +1.57  18% +0.81  23% -1.69  55% 
 
 
Secondly, there is no tariff which does not make 6% or more of the lowest-income 
households worse off by more than £1 p.w. These will be the high-water-consuming 
households in this income group. For some of them, their high water use will reflect 
discretionary rather than essential use, and a cutback in that use would reduce these 
extra charges they would pay under metering (Options 5-11 include a lifeline 
allowance, to reduce the likelihood of cutbacks on essential water use). Where their 
high water use is essential, this is likely to be due to medical reasons, and it should be 
possible to make special arrangements to make rebates of some charges through the 
benefits system. In these two ways, it is likely that the great majority of low-income 
households would be able to reduce any extra charges they would face under the 
metering tariffs. 
 
Thirdly, the tariffs vary considerably in the degree of redistribution from richer to 
poorer which they bring about (as noted above, all are redistributive in this direction 
to some extent). The least redistributive is Option 5, whereby the average cost to the 
richest households is only £0.17 p.w., and only 25% lose more than £1 p.w. 
 
Which of these tariff options is ‘best’ depends on political perspective. Option 3 
(volumetric rate varying according to stretched Council Tax bands) leaves fewest 
households in the two lowest income groups worse off by over £1 p.w. Option 9 
(lifeline allowance and the charge per litre of water varying according to stretched 
Council Tax band ratios) is very similar in this respect, but is substantially more 6 
redistributive from richer to poorer households. Option 4 (standing charge varying 
according to stretched Council Tax bands) is also similar in this respect, but is less 
redistributive. Option 5 a lifeline allowance of 15 m
3 per capita and an increased 
price per litre of water) is least redistributive, but leaves more low-income 
households with extra bills in excess of £1 p.w. (12% as opposed to 8% for the lowest 
income group).  
 
It is hoped that, should universal metering be adopted in the UK, in some regions or 
as a whole, such detailed tariff design issues will get adequate consideration, so that 




1.1  The need to manage water use 
 
England is generally thought of as a wet country, but in fact rainfall in much of the 
country is moderate (and East Anglia is officially semi-arid), while the population 
density is high, especially in the south of England. As a consequence, England has 
less water resources per capita than Spain or Portugal. In the Thames Water region, 
water resources per capita are less than in Ethiopia or Sudan (World Resources 
Institute 1999). 
 
Water usage in England and Wales rose more or less continually during the twentieth 
century and particularly after the Second World War. Per capita consumption rose 
dramatically between 1961 (87 l per person per day) and 1999 (146 l per person per 
day). However, because industrial demand for water has been falling since the 1970s, 
total water usage increased more slowly. It peaked in 1996 and by 1999 had fallen 
around 15% to the levels of the mid-1970s (National Consumer Council 2000, 
National Consumer Council 2002). The main reason for the dramatic fall was that 
after the 1996 drought Ofwat gave the water companies strict and binding targets for 
leakage reduction. However, leakage reduction is a one-time gain and even by 2001/2, 
leakage was already increasing again, particularly in the Thames region (Environment 
Agency 2002).  
 
Total future water demand in England may either rise or fall over the period until 
2025 depending on the extent to which water conservation policies are followed 
(Environment Agency 2001). In parts of the country, particularly the South and East, 
population increases are expected that would be likely to place additional demands on 
water resources. Unfortunately, the South and the East are the two regions that already 
have the greatest difficulties in meeting demand. Many regions already have 
excessive river abstraction and the southern and eastern regions also have 
unsustainable groundwater abstraction. The South and the East are beyond their 
sustainable use of water resources. Other regions are at or near the limits. Only in the 8 
North East is there additional water available. In other regions there is little capacity 
to increase the water supply (Environment Agency 2001). That means that the 
capacity to meet increased demand is very limited. In addition, expected climate 
change over the next decades causing hotter and drier weather will reduce the supply 
of rainwater and is likely to increase demand for water. The effect of climate change 
on water resources is likely to be particularly pronounced in southern and eastern 
England. 
 
In this situation it is curious that the water usage of most households in the UK is not 
measured. Among OECD countries, only the UK and Ireland do not measure the 
water use of most households – in Ireland water services are provided free and paid 
for out of general taxation (OECD 1999). Consequently UK water companies 
generally have very poor data on how much water is being used by households in 
different areas, and what factors influence that use. Their ability to manage the 
household use of water, and indeed households’ ability to manage such use 
themselves, is low. The contrast between water and other utilities (gas, electricity, 
telephone), the use of all of which is measured on a unit basis, is marked. The need to 
measure water use in order to manage it is a strong argument in favour of universal 
water metering, especially in those regions which have been or may be affected by 
water shortages. 
 
Especially in a context of increasing household water demand, another argument in 
favour of metering is that it can help to conserve water – metering has been found to 
reduce water consumption by about 10% on average (National Metering Trials 
Working Group 1993). It is in fact not surprising that people tend to use less water 
when they pay for it on a per unit basis than when it is free at the point of use, and this 
difference would be likely to become more marked either as people moved towards 
less water-intensive equipment (which would then save them money), or water 





1.2 Concerns  about water metering 
 
A popular argument against metering is that there are cheaper ways of conserving 
water, as shown in Table 1.1. For instance, low-flush toilets reduce total water 
consumption by nearly as much as metering does, but low-flush toilets cost less than 
metering does. Water metering costs £20-30 per household per annum. However, it is 
not clear how people will be persuaded to install low flush toilets, efficient appliances, 
and water saving taps and showerheads if they do not have any incentive to do it. Nor 
is it easy to establish how much water they would in fact save when the water 
consumption to which they relate is not measured. The point of water metering is not 
just to gain the 7-10% reduction in water consumption that occurs initially, but also to 
create a situation where people will install water saving equipment in future, and 
where the result of them doing so will be apparent. 10 
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Source:  OXERA 1998, p. 10 
 
Another argument against water metering is that increased water demand can be 
addressed by increasing supply, as has been done in the past. In pure financial terms, 
as Table 1.1 shows, increasing supply is more expensive than leakage control, 
converting 9 litre WCs or metering as part of rehabilitation works (Clark et al 1998a, 
p.10). It is about as expensive as the compulsory metering of sprinkler users, but 
cheaper than universal metering, while voluntary metering (the current situation in the 
UK) is the most expensive option of all.  
 
It should, however, be noted that these comparisons do not take into account the 
environmental costs of increasing supply in terms of damage to wetlands and 
estuaries, and consequent loss of habitat and biodiversity (ibid, pp. 6-7). The case for 
water metering, as opposed to increasing supply, rests on environmental arguments. 
Increasing abstraction of river water and groundwater are cheap, but unsustainable in 
the long term. Building more reservoirs is more expensive financially and involves 
using up land, and may be no cheaper than water metering. It clearly has a much 
greater environmental impact than water metering. In most of England and Wales, 
there is little or no capacity to increase water supply without unacceptable 
environmental impacts (Environment Agency 2001). 
 
It is also argued that water metering is unfair because most of the costs of the industry 
are fixed. John Thackray of the Public Utilities Access Forum has estimated that they 
can be divided as follows: 
 
Water supply pipe network    30% 
Water resources and treatment  20% 
Sewer  network   10% 12 
Sewage treatment and disposal  20% 
Rainwater disposal from properties  10% 




Opponents of metering argue that most of these costs are not dependent on the 
quantity of water used, so charging on the basis of use is irrelevant. However, the 
quantity of water used does have an impact on cost. The social costs of additional 
marginal use of water are high, particularly in regions which are short of supply and 
are making unsustainable use of abstraction. What is more, the rising water 
consumption by households in recent years is entirely accounted for by increases in 
non-essential uses. Not charging for use means that there is no incentive for less 
wasteful use. Britain is one of very few countries in the world where water metering is 
not standard (OECD 1999). It is important to note that when Ofwat surveyed 
consumers they identified water metering as the fairest way to pay for water (National 
Consumer Council 2000). 
 
Another particular concern that is often expressed about water metering is that it can 
lead to poorer households cutting back on essential uses such as personal hygiene. 
There is some evidence to support this concern (DoE/OFWAT 1992, Consumers’ 
Association 1996), but attempts to prove that this leads to higher rates of disease have 
failed to show a link (Clark et al 1998a). Nonetheless, the British Medical Association 
(BMA) has stated that water is vital to halting the chain of infection and should 
therefore be available to all at an affordable price (BMA 1994). 
 
However, it is not the intention of this paper to make the case for or against metering, 
or seek to adjudicate between the arguments for the various options in Table 1. Rather 
the paper is based on an acknowledgement that there are strong arguments in favour 
of water metering, and that metering may therefore be introduced into the UK on a 
universal basis, as it has been in other countries. If this were to occur, the research in 
paper is addressed to the question of what charging structures relating to metering 
could be introduced in order to limit the financial impact of metering on low-income 13 
households. In order to consider this question it is necessary first of all to set out how 
the household use of water is currently paid for in the UK.  
 
1.3  Current methods of water charging 
 
The traditional method of charging domestic customers for water in the UK has been 
on the basis of rateable values (RVs), a hangover from the days of local authority 
ownership of the water supply. The water bill is divided into a standing charge (the 
same for each household) and an additional charge based on the rateable value of the 
home. Some water companies make the standing charge the main element of the bill; 
others make the rateable value the main element of the bill. RVs were last assessed in 
1973, so they bear little relation to present property values. Other anomalies in the 
valuation system are that RVs are lower for houses than for equivalent flats and that 
RVs tend to be very low for rural properties and pre-1919 properties, even if they are 
large and valuable (Thackray 1997). The rateable value system was abolished for 
local government taxation in 1989 and nearly all homes built or substantially 
renovated since 1990 have had water meters installed. In 1989, it was legislated that 
RVs would be abolished for water charging purposes in 2000 and replaced with an 
unspecified alternative system, but the deadline was deferred into the indefinite future 
by the 1999 Water Industry Act. 
 
Water metering became an option for existing properties in 1990. By 1999, 17 per 
cent of households were metered (National Consumer Council 2000). Since 2000, 
households have had the right to the free installation of a meter and the proportion 
metered had reached around 23 per cent by 2002 (OFWAT 2002). A complaint made 
against the optional metering that exists now is that the people who take it up tend to 
be small households in larger properties, generally richer than the average. Because 
variable costs are only a proportion of the costs of the water industry, what happens is 
that the bills of people who are not metered, generally poorer, increase (National 
Consumer Council 2000). Obviously this could be addressed by increasing the 
volumetric charge to metered customers, but this would reduce the incentive to switch 
to metering. Another source of contention is that, also in order to encourage people to 
switch to metering, the additional administrative costs of metering and billing are not 14 
borne by those being metered, but shared among all consumers, which is effectively a 
subsidy of the metered by the non-metered. Since those opting for voluntary metering 
tend to be the better off who live in high rateable value homes, and the non-metered 
tend to be poorer, in this respect poorer consumers are subsidising richer consumers. 
On the other hand, the RV system is itself an extensive system of often illogical cross-
subsidies. In particular, those in rural areas are heavily subsidised by those in urban 
areas. They impose higher costs, yet they actually pay less. An even more illogical 
subsidy is of those in older houses by those in more modern properties because of the 
characteristics of the RV system. 
 
Distributional effects of water metering 
 
As noted above, most households in other OECD countries except Ireland are metered 
(OECD 1999), but water charging in England and Wales has a higher proportional 
impact on the poor than in any other of nine OECD countries surveyed except 
possibly Mexico (OECD 2003, p.61). Although the average proportion of disposable 
income spent on the water supply in England and Wales is 1.2%, which is about 
average, the proportion of income spent by the lowest decile is 3.75%, the second 
highest among the nine OECD countries compared - Mexico is just ahead at 3.84%. In 
no other country was it above 2.53%. The ratio of the burden on the lowest income 
group compared to the burden on the average is highest in England and Wales (3.1), 
followed closely by Mexico (3.0). This shows that the widely-repeated claim that 
water metering necessarily has a greater proportional impact on the poor than the RV 
system used in the UK is quite false. 
 
The reason why water charging in England and Wales is so regressive is probably 
because a large proportion of unmeasured water bills is composed of a standing 
charge that is the same across all households in the water company’s area. Only a 
proportion of the bill is based on rateable value. This is one of the aspects examined in 
the metering tariff structures explored in Section 3. 
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2. Past research on metering 
 
2.1  Institute for fiscal studies work 
 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) examined the question of the regressivity of 
water metering in England and Wales in 1993 (Pearson, Rajah and Smith 1993). They 
used data from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) with the Severn Trent Water 
Domestic Consumption Monitor (DCM) - a record of the details of the water 
consumption of around 1500 volunteer households plus about thirty other variables 
including the number of people in the household, the rateable value, location, tenure 
type, property type, occupation, age of occupants and information on water-using 
equipment. Average water consumption was about 125 litres per person per day. 
Regression analysis was used to derive a model that could explain nearly half the 
variance in water consumption. The other half of the variance was treated as random. 
The model was apparently able to predict the average water consumption of groups of 
households quite well, but it was not able to identify how an individual household 
would be affected by water metering. It is very important to note that the Severn Trent 
monitor did not provide information about household income – that was imputed from 
information about other household parameters using the FES. 
 
IFS compared the distributional effects of four alternatives to the RV system: a flat-
rate licence fee for all households, a charge based on the number of people in the 
household, a charge based on the type of property and water metering.  
 
A switch to a licence fee would be highly regressive. The poorest households would 
lose substantially, while the richest households would gain substantially, particularly 
those in the tenth decile. In terms of household size, it would tend to substantially 
increase the bills of one adult households, while reducing the bills of two adult 
households and substantially reducing the bills of households with three or more 
adults. Pensioner households would on average lose slightly. 
 16 
A charge based on the type of property (whether detached house, semi-detached, 
bungalow or terrace, or a flat) would have similar effects, although not so 
substantially redistributive from poor to rich. The banding according to property type 
was very crude, but IFS used that because there was no Council Tax banding data for 
the households in the FES. Because the FES stopped recording property type in 1984-
5, they used the FES for that year (with all prices indexed to 1992 levels).  
 
Charging for water according to Council Tax banding would be more regressive than 
according to RVs (the present system) because Council Tax bands are weighted 
towards lower cost homes. Extrapolating from the IFS work, it would be somewhat 
regressive. It would be possible to re-weight the bands to make the effect less 
regressive (simulations of this kind are carried out in Section 3 with the Anglian 
Water data). 
 
A charge based on the number of people in the household has rather different effects. 
It was found to be on average broadly neutral for the bottom three deciles, negative 
for the middle four deciles, neutral for the eighth decile and positive for the top two 
deciles, especially the tenth. It redistributes income from the middle of the income 
range to the top. The reason for that is mostly because the households in the top 
quintile are on average smaller than households in the middle quintiles. 
 
IFS analysed the distributional effects of water metering, assuming that there was a 
fixed charge of £30 per household irrespective of consumption (to cover the fixed 
costs of metering each household) and that the remainder of the cost would be based 
on water usage at a flat rate per cubic metre. Under these assumptions, the bottom 
three deciles again break even on average. The middle four deciles lose a little, the 
eighth decile breaks even, the ninth decile gains a little and the top decile gains a great 
deal. That is because the top quintile actually uses less water than the third and fourth 
quintiles because it tends to live in smaller households. Because of limitations to their 
data, IFS was not able to describe the effects on individual households (as opposed to 
deciles) and give a detailed breakdown of the distribution of gainers and losers in each 
part of the income spectrum for water metering. Although the pattern of shifts 
between deciles is similar to that of charging on the basis of the number in the 
household, it is less marked. 17 
 
A few comments can be made about the IFS analysis. Firstly, they assumed that the 
total amount charged for water would remain the same under the water metering 
system, but there are in fact additional costs of £20-30 per annum per household 
associated with water metering. They would amount to an increase of about 5-10% in 
the cost of water if universal water metering was introduced at a stroke. On the other 
hand, water metering leads to reductions in water consumption of around 10%; that 
would reduce costs somewhat. However, the additional cost of metering is a 
significant stumbling block to the introduction of compulsory water metering. One 
solution might be to transfer the costs of highway drainage to the roads budget (which 
is how it was paid for before 1973). That would balance out the additional cost of 
water metering in bills. 
 
Secondly, IFS assumed that there would be a standing charge and then a charge for 
each cubic metre of water consumption – in other words a regressive charging 
scheme. A charge related strictly to water consumption would tend to charge smaller 
and poorer households less and larger and richer households more. Note, however, 
that because the richest households tend to use less water than those in the middle of 
the income range (because they are smaller), simple water metering will tend to lead 
to gains for the richest and losses for those in the middle. 
 
Thirdly, the fundamental disadvantage with the approach IFS used is that because of 
the nature of the predictive methodology which was used to link the Severn Trent 
DCM data and the FES samples, the information on households in which 
consumption was above or below average was lost. Only the average consumption for 
each consumer group was predicted for the FES observations. However, social 
concerns about water metering in the UK usually relate to the possible adverse effects 
of metering on vulnerable households which have above-average consumption either 
as a result of family size or medical conditions. It is precisely the effects of water 
metering on households that have above-average consumption that is the main focus 




2.2  OXERA and other work 
 
A study by OXERA (Clark et al 1998a, Clark et al 1998b) for UK Water Industry 
Research instead used actual data from the Severn Trent DCM, which enabled them to 
predict what would be the effect on individual households of different water metering 
tariffs. The disadvantage with their approach is that because the DCM did not collect 
income data, they were not able to make predictions about particular income groups. 
The particular concern of the study was to examine the effect of different proposed 
water metering schemes on ‘vulnerable households’, defined as those with low 
incomes or high essential use, such as large families and households containing 
someone with a medical condition such as incontinence or skin disease which requires 
high water consumption. Unfortunately, they did not have data on household income 
or medical conditions. They had to rely on information about proxies for poverty such 
as being elderly or in generally poorer ACORN areas.
ii It should also be noted that the 
average RV of the households in the DCM sample was £255, while the average RV 
among Severn Trent households was £192. In order to adjust for this lack of 
representativeness, the unmeasured bills were rescaled by 192/255. However, because 
the water consumption of households is known to correlate quite well with RV, this 
rescaling will have introduced a systematic error tending to overstate the likely water 
bills from a switch to universal metering. Severn Trent does not have a standing 
charge, but all the other water companies do, so the OXERA team recalculated the 
gains or losses based on an assumed tariff more typical of other water companies. 
 
It would be useful to be able to identify households with high essential use due to 
large numbers of people. However, it is generally not considered practical to keep up-
to-date registers of the number of individuals in each household in the UK, as is 
frequently said to have been demonstrated by the experience of the ‘poll tax’ in the 
early 1990s. It is the case that Flanders has introduced a water metering tariff where 
each individual is given a ‘free’ allowance of 15m
3 of water per annum (equivalent to 
41.1 litres/day) to cover essential use, with metered payment for use above that 
amount (OECD 1999). A special register is maintained to support the scheme, but it 
must be remembered that in Flanders each citizen or resident already has an identity 
card. The introduction of such a water-metering scheme in the UK (at least for as long 19 
as the UK does not have an identity card) would be likely to be more expensive and 
meet with greater resistance. 
 
Paul Herrington (Herrington 1996) instead proposed an allowance based on one adult 
plus the number of children in the household. The information for that would be 
obtained from child allowance records (in practice this would require data protection 
issues to be addressed). An allowance of 60 litres per person per day (equivalent to 
21.9 m
3 per person per annum) would be made at a special low price. It would avoid 
the risks to public health that could otherwise be posed by water metering. The 
scheme would involve some cross-subsidisation of households with children and 
single person households by larger adult households. This approach is based on the 
use of a universal benefit to determine eligibility for concessions. A more targeted 
approach that Herrington suggests as an alternative would instead use means-tested 
benefits to provide eligibility for rebates. Such a system is used in Melbourne, 
Australia. The effects of some such schemes are analysed in Section 3. 
 
OXERA considered two basic policy instruments for minimising the effects of 
metered bills on low-income households: direct subsidies by social security payments; 
and cross-subsidies by making metered tariffs sensitive to the socio-economic status 
of the household. Direct subsidies could take two forms. There could be an additional 
payment within existing benefits, or there could be a tailor-made water charges 
benefit. About 70% of households receive a state benefit, including many wealthy 
households because of universal benefits, while 30% of households receive income-
related benefits. The proportion of households receiving income-related benefits is 
over 60% in the lowest three deciles, but it falls sharply to only a few percent in the 
highest deciles. OXERA suggested the idea of incorporating an extra payment into 
Council Tax Benefit or using it as a prototype for a separate ‘Water Charges Benefit’. 
 
The alternative to direct subsidies to consumers is cross-subsidies through water 
tariffs. OXERA examined the effect of five different tariff schemes using the Severn 
Trent DCM data: 
 
•  Universal metering, with a standard two-part tariff that consists of a standing 
charge of £34 and a single unit price of £1.54/m
3 applicable all year round. 20 
 
•  Universal metering, with a rising-block tariff that consists of a fixed charge of 
£67 that entitles all consumers to a ‘free’ block of lifeline consumption set at 
60 m
3 per property per year, with consumption beyond this level attracting a 
year-round price of £2.37/m
3. 
 
•  Universal metering, with a rising-block tariff very similar to that above, except 
that households whose monthly summer (June-August) consumption is at least 
10% greater than their monthly winter consumption pay a 40% surcharge on 
this excess. 
 
•  Universal metering, with a rising-block tariff with a summer surcharge similar 
to that described above, except that the fixed charge and ‘free’ allowance vary 
according to the Council Tax band. The unit charge was £2.33/m
3. The tariff 
was structured as in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1  Tariff parameters based on Council Tax bands used in the OXERA 
model 
 
Council tax band  Fixed charge (£/year)  Free allowance (m
3/year)
  Water  only  Combined water and 
sewerage 
 
A 44  66  120 
B 44  66  120 
C 44  66  80 
D 64  96  60 
E 64  96  0 
F 84  126  0 
G 84  126  0 
Source:  Clark et al 1998a, p.65 
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•  Selective metering of households in Council Tax bands C-H, with a standard 
two-part tariff as in the first option, except that a summer surcharge is also 
incorporated. 
 
OXERA first attempted to assess the environmental benefits in terms of demand 
reduction from the different tariffs, based on the ranges identified in a review of the 
literature. 
 
Table  2.2  Summary of effects of different measured tariff structures on 
demand 
 

















Standard  -10 -20 -10 -20 
Rising  block  -18 -27 -22 -33 
Rising block with summer 
surcharge 
-18 -28 -26 -36 
Rising block varied by 
Council Tax band 
-15 -22 -22 -29 
Selective metering with 
summer surcharge 
-8  -15 -11 -18 
a The low demand reaction scenario is based on the assumptions that demand falls by 10% as a result of 
metering and that increases in the volumetric tariff above the current level are associated with price 
elasticities of –0.2 in winter and –0.4 in summer.
 b The high demand reaction scenario is based on the 
assumptions that demand falls by 20% as a result of metering and that increases in the volumetric tariff 
above the current level are associated with price elasticities of –0.2 in winter and –0.4 in summer. 
Source:  Clark et al 1998b, p.23 
 
Table 2.2 shows that the standard tariff leads to a reduction in demand of 10-20%, 
depending on the assumptions, but it is no higher in summer when the environmental 
stresses tend to be greater. A rising block tariff (with or without a summer surcharge) 
leads to a further reduction of around 7.5%. The reduction is greater in summer (12-22 
16%), and particularly when there is a summer surcharge. The rising-block tariff that 
varies by Council Tax band does not give such large demand reductions as the other 
rising-block tariffs because of the large amounts of ‘free’ water provided to 
households in the lower Council Tax bands. However, it still gives a greater reduction 
in consumption than the standard tariff, particularly in the summer. Selective metering 
(assuming 60% of the population is metered) has the least effect. The demand 
reductions projected from universal metering are substantial. 
 
OXERA then attempted to assess the distributional impact of the different tariffs on 
water and sewerage bills. It was initially assumed that no demand reductions would 
take place. As well as looking at the effect on all households, they also examined the 
effect on ‘vulnerable’ households. Due to the lack of income data, these were taken to 
be households with ACORN codes placing them in most deprived 15% of postcodes. 
 
Regression analysis carried out in the present project using the Family Expenditure 
Survey 2000-01 shows that ACORN actually correlates less well than Council Tax 
band with income. The coefficient of income and ACORN number is –0.253 (sig. 
0.000), while the coefficient of income and Council Tax band is 0.396 (sig. 0.000). 
Might it be that ‘vulnerable’ ACORNs do correlate better with income than Council 
Tax band A? ACORN has recently been reclassified to create a larger number of 
subtypes (55 instead of 38) and make their ordering more logical. Under the new 
classification, 22% of households are in the poorest ACORN group (G), while 24% of 
households are in the lowest-value Council Tax band A. However, the coefficient of 
income and Council Tax band A is –0.239 (sig. 0.000), while the coefficient of 
income and ACORN group G is only –0.159 (sig. 0.000). In other words, what the 
OXERA study used as a test of the reliability of Council Tax band as a means of 
finding low-income households was actually less reliable than Council Tax band is.  23 
Table 2.3  Summary of effects (%) of metering on water and sewerage bills 
for different groups of households assuming no demand reduction scenario 

















     
Standard  35.6 21.0 20.4 23.0 1052 














24.2 10.0 13.0 16.5 860 
‘Vulnerable’ 
households 
     
Standard  43.9 21.6 21.6 12.8 148 















9.2 1.7 3.4 3.4 119 24 
a Does not sum to 100 because a significant proportion of households do not experience a change in 
their bills. 
Source:  Clark et al 1998b, p.26 
 
The results in Table 2.3 above were based on very pessimistic assumptions about cost 
reductions from a switch to metering and should be regarded as a worst-case scenario. 
The first three tariffs – the standard tariff, the rising block tariff and the summer 
surcharge tariff – make about half of households better off, and half of households 
worse off. Most of the gains and losses are greater than £1 per week, so they represent 
significant changes to customers’ bills. Losses are disproportionately concentrated 
among ‘vulnerable’ households. About 40% of them lose more than £1 per week. 
However, only about 40% of all households lose under the tariff varied by Council 
Tax band, and only about 25% of ‘vulnerable’ households lose (meaning that 75% of 
these households are net gainers), about 18% by more than £1 per week. This makes 
this option very progressive overall. Selective metering has a smaller impact because 
only some households are included. It largely passes ‘vulnerable’ households by. 
About 10% lose, mostly by more than £1 per week. 
 
The OXERA report also considered the impact of the proposed tariffs on two typical 
households with high essential water use due to medical conditions, based on 
consultation with the BMA about likely water use. In both cases, the households were 













Table  2.4  Weekly changes in water only bill under different tariffs (£) – 






















Family with two 
children with severe 
eczema 
+2.09 +2.79  +3.58  +1.43  0 
Pensioner household 
with one severely 
incontinent member 
+0.94 +1.27  +1.75  +0.04  0 
 
 
It can be seen from Table 2.4 that the tariff varying by Council Tax band has less 
impact on these households than the other universal metering tariffs. However, it 
should be noted that for such households living in higher band properties the 
additional costs could be quite substantial. The thinking in the report seemed to be 
that households in higher band properties would be able to afford it without hardship. 
 
3. Present research using anglian water data 
 
3.1  Analysis of the data 
 
The research undertaken by PSI in the present project has used data kindly provided 
Anglian Water from their SoDCon water consumption monitor. The crucial difference 
between this data and the Severn Trent data used in the earlier studies is that it 
provides information about household incomes. For the first time in the UK, it is 
possible to directly examine how water consumption varies in relation to income. That 26 
means it is also possible to directly examine the distributional impact of different 
universal water metering tariffs. 
 
The SoDCon sample is taken from Anglian Water customers, stratified by county and 
by ACORN. There are 1320 households in the sample, of which 678 (51%) pay 
according to rateable value and 642 (49%) are metered. The proportions match the 
proportions among Anglian water customers as a whole. The average rateable value of 
the unmeasured households in the sample is £199, while the average rateable value of 
all Anglian’s water customers is £178. The difference is relatively small and it was 
not felt necessary to rescale. As well as providing data on water consumption, 
SoDCon provides data on ACORN, payment method, RV (if applicable), numbers of 
adults and children, the occupational status of the adults and the educational level of 
children, shift work, use of appliances at night, kind of property, number of bedrooms, 
gardens, washing machines, dishwashers, water softeners, showers and power 
showers, sprinklers, hosepipes, jet pressure washers, watering cans, water butts, 
garden ponds, frequency of gardening, frequency of car washing, and household 
income. Data relating these variables to Council Tax band became available later in 
the project, and was used for the simulations . 
 
The income data provided by Anglian Water places households in six bands: £0-
£10,000 per year, £10,001-£20,000, £20,001-£30,000, £30,001-£40,000, £40,001-
£80,000 and over £80,000. The bottom band roughly corresponds to the lowest three 
deciles, which are the ones generally regarded as having low incomes. 
 
For the income question, there were also boxes for “don’t know” and “refuse”. Out of 
1315 households taking part, 5.7% ticked “don’t know” and 11.5% ticked “refuse”, 
giving a total non-response rate for income of 17.2%. A regression analysis was run to 
see whether membership of these groups correlated with ACORN, the best available 
proxy for income. There was a coefficient of 0.103 (sig. 0.000) between don’t knows 
and ACORN, in the direction that those from poorer ACORN groups were more 
likely to not know their household income. There was no correlation between 
ACORN and refusal to answer the income question. The relationship between 
membership of these groups and water consumption was also tested. There was a 
coefficient of 0.061 (sig. 0.028) between the don’t knows and water consumption, in 27 
the direction that don’t knows were more likely to have lower water consumption. 
There was no correlation between water consumption and refusal to answer the 
income question. It can be concluded that the systematic bias introduced by the non-
response rate to the income question was small in relation to the sampling error and 
probably due to poorer households being slightly more likely to answer “don’t know”. 
 
How well does the sample reflect the actual income distribution in East Anglia? Table 
3.1 gives a comparison of the incomes reported by the households in the sample 
(n=1094) with the reported gross incomes for households in East Anglia in the Family 
Expenditure Survey 2000-2001 (n=261): 
 
Table 3.1  Comparison of incomes reported in the Anglian Water SoDCon 
sample and the FES East Anglian sub-sample 
 
Income  Anglian Water  FES  
£0-10,000 19%  23% 
£10,001-£20,000 26%  29% 
£20,001-£30,000 24%  20% 
£30,001-£40,000 15%  14% 
£40,001-£80,000 11%  11% 
> £80,000  2%  1% 
 
The totals do not sum to 100% due to rounding. Table 3.1 shows that the incomes 
reported by the Anglian Water sample in 2002 are slightly higher than the incomes 
reported by the FES sample for 2000-2001, but not significantly so. Both the effects 
of wage inflation and random sampling errors could account for the difference. 
Another factor could be that those on lower incomes may have been slightly more 
likely to answer “don’t know” to the household income question. However, the 
distribution of incomes reported by the Anglian Water sample appears to be fairly 
representative. 
 
Average household size in the Anglian Water sample was 2.64 people. That is slightly 
larger than the national average of 2.33 in 2001 (National Statistics, 2002). The 28 
average household size in the larger East of England region was 2.40 in 1999 
(National Statistics 2001). The fact that the households appear to be slightly larger 
than average will tend to slightly overstate the use of water to be expected. 
 
A simple regression analysis found that household income does correlate with 
household water consumption. The coefficient was 0.178 (sig. 0.000), and was very 
similar for both metered and RV households examined separately. An analysis among 
only the RV households found a coefficient between RV and household water 
consumption of 0.251 (sig. 0.000), showing that RV is a better predictor of water 
consumption than income is. The coefficient between Council Tax band and 
household water consumption is 0.247 (sig. 0.000), almost exactly the same as RV. 
 
A multiple regression analysis was run to see how all the different possible 
explanatory factors correlated with household water consumption. A rather surprising 
result was revealed: income is not an explanatory variable in such a multiple 
regression. In other words, it is not a higher income itself that makes households use 
more water, but other factors that tend to correlate with income. The factors (with a 
negative coefficient meaning the factor tended to reduce water use) that were 
statistically significant (sig. 0.050 or better) were: number of adults (coefficient 0.464, 
sig. 0.000), number of children (0.172, sig. 0.013), having a garden (0.207, sig. 
0.017), having a shared garden (0.160, sig. 0.007), having a courtyard (0.157, sig. 
0.000), having a jet washer (-0.052, sig. 0.043) and having a sprinkler (0.046, sig. 
0.036). There is one coefficient which just misses statistical significance: having a 
washing machine (-0.068, sig. 0.058). 
 
These results are for the sample as a whole. It is interesting to compare the two sub-
groups, the RV and the metered households. For RV households, the statistically 
significant factors were: number of adults (0.406, sig. 0.000), number of children 
(0.222, sig. 0.043), having a courtyard (0.255, sig. 0.000), having a shared garden 
(0.216, sig. 0.002), having a garden (0.204, sig. 0.011), presence of a housewife 
(0.117, sig. 0.045), number of bedrooms (0.090, sig. 0.022), rateable value (0.088, sig. 
0.038) and having a sprinkler (0.083, sig. 0.012). 
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For metered households, the statistically significant factors were: number of adults 
(0.460, sig. 0.000), ownership of a washing machine (-0.142, sig. 0.002) and number 
of bedrooms (0.120, sig. 0.005). Frequent gardening just misses statistical significance 
(0.075, sig. 0.051). Interestingly, the correlation with the number of children is not 
statistically significant (0.138, sig. 0.174), while the different types of gardens and 
courtyards or ownership of a sprinkler no longer produce any correlations.  
 
A number of interesting conclusions about the effect of metering can be deduced from 
comparison of the two sets of results. It appears that metering makes people with 
washing machines use less water, to the extent that they actually end up using 
significantly less water than people who do not have a washing machine! Metering 
also appears to dramatically reduce their use of water for gardening, although people 
who do more gardening may possibly cut back less. Metered users also appear not to 
use their sprinklers as RV households do. 
 
It is very difficult to explain why the presence of a housewife should increase water 
consumption in RV households, but not in metered ones. It is a particularly strange 
result given that the presence of retired or unemployed people does not appear to 
increase the use of water. However, these results are only barely statistically 
significant, so they may well be flukes. 
 
In terms of quantity of water use, examination of water usage by households in the 
Anglian Water sample with different numbers of adults and children shows that the 
first adult in a household on average uses around 140 litres/day (50m
3/year). A second 
or additional adult uses around 100 litres/day (35m
3/year). A child uses around 60 
litres/day (20m
3/year). The figures for unmetered households are somewhat higher 
and the figures for metered households are somewhat lower. 
 
The range of usage even by households with the same number of adults and children 
paying on the same basis is quite wide. Households at the 90
th percentile use between 
two and three times as much water as equivalent households at the 10
th percentile. 
Households at the 80
th percentile use nearly twice as much water as equivalent 
households at the 20
th percentile. It is not clear that this extra use by such a large 30 
number of households, compared to similar households, can be justified on the basis 
of medical conditions or similar needs. 
 
However, it is clear, as recognised in Section 1, that a certain amount water use is 
vital for both health and hygiene. For this reason, a popular idea in the design of 
socially-conscious water tariffs is the idea of a ‘lifeline’ tranche of free or fixed cost 
water to cover essential uses. The intention is to prevent water metering resulting in 
poor households sacrificing hygiene in order to save money. The OXERA research 
reported above included a free water allowance as one of its options, and it was noted 
that this option (which also varied charges according to the Council Tax band) was 
progressive overall and affected fewer ‘vulnerable’ households negatively that the 
other options analysed. 
 
In the simulations of metering that follow using the Anglian data, a number of 
approaches have been taken to designing metering tariffs, in order to study the 
distributional effects and, particularly, the effects on low-income households. It has 
already been noted that the current system of water charging (still predominantly 
based on rateable values) is more regressive than in other industrial countries which 
have universal or nearly universal metering of household water use. It is most unlikely 
that universal metering will be regarded as politically acceptable in the UK if it makes 
this existing regressivity worse. At the same time, given the range of water usage even 
between similar households revealed by the Anglian data, it is also most unlikely that 
any switch to metering will leave no low-income household worse off, unless it 
involves a degree of cross-subsidy of poorer households by richer households that is 
also likely to be politically problematic. The politics of water metering needs 
therefore to take account of three factors: factor one, the overall regressivity of the 
system; factor two, the negative impacts on individual, high-water-using low-income 
households; and factor three, the degree of redistribution (from richer to poorer 
households) that is required to reduce factors one and two. The results that are 
reported from the simulations therefore focus on these factors. 
 
The simulations that have been modelled are of five types: 
•  A simple switch to water metering on the basis of the Anglian tariff 31 
•  A switch to water metering using tariffs that vary by Council Tax band 
•  A switch to water metering which incorporates a lifeline allowance that may 
also vary with Council Tax band 
•  A switch which involves a combination of tariffs and a lifeline allowance that 
may also vary with Council Tax band  
•  A switch using the Severn Trent tariff 
 
In all the simulations it has been assumed that there were no demand reductions 
induced by the switch to metering. This is unrealistic. To the extent that metering 
induces demand reductions (which, in line with the data in Section 1 and the OXERA 
modelling reported in Section 2, could be from 7-28%, assuming no summer 
surcharge), and especially if these reductions are concentrated in high-water-using 
households, the negative financial effects of the switch on high-water-using 
households will be reduced. 
 
For most of the simulations studied the results for the whole Anglian data sample, and 
then given separately for the households who are currently metered or charged 
according to rateable value (RV). To avoid breaking up the text excessively, many of 
the tables have been moved to the end of paper, and are in Annex 1, though they are 
referred to in the main text where they generate useful insights. 
 
3.2  Simulations of metering  
 
3.2.1  The Anglian tariff 
 
The next stage of the analysis is to examine the effects of a switch to universal 
metering, assuming no demand reduction. The first option to be explored (Option 1) 
was the effect of a switch to metering using the Anglian Water tariff for 2002-03, 
shown in Table 3.2. It turns out that the average annual loss of such a switch for RV 
households in the sample would be £0.73, so such a switch can be treated as revenue-
neutral overall. 
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According to OFWAT, the tariff differential for Anglian Water customers in 2002-3 
was £20. That is to say that if a household with average rateable value switched from 
the unmeasured to the metered tariff and had water consumption equal to the average 
unmeasured household, they would pay £20 more, calculated as a contribution   
towards the cost of metering. Of course, households that actually switch to metering 
tend to have higher RVs and use less water than the average, so that the switch is 
financially advantageous to them. 
 
Table 3.2  Anglian Water tariffs (£) for April 2002 – March 2003 
 
   Water  Sewerage 
Unmeasured       
Standing charge  69.12  91.89 
RV multiplier  0.3678  0.4807 
       
Measured       
Standing charge  20  44 
Volumetric 















Table 3.3a  Summary of effects of metering with existing Anglian Water tariff 
on water and sewerage bills of RV and metered customers for 




























-0.01  14%  9%  47% 13% 17% 1307 
£0-£10,000  +0.34  8%  10% 50% 8%  23% 200 
£10,001-
£20,000 
-0.02  15%  8%  49% 12% 16% 281 
£20,001-
£30,000 
-0.01  15%  13% 38% 15% 19% 264 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-0.19  18%  9%  50% 13% 10% 119 
>  £80,000  +0.38  10%  18% 44% 3%  25% 24 
 
The bills of a large proportion of customers are unchanged because Table 3.3a shows 
the effect on both RV and metered customers of compulsory metering at the existing 
Anglian metered tariff. Compulsory metering with this tariff would lead to gains on 
average for households with incomes up to £10,000 a year and only 8% of such 
households would lose. The effect on households with incomes between £10,000 and 
£30,000 is neutral, while households with incomes between £30,000 and £80,000 lose 
on average, although the small number of households with incomes over £80,000 gain 
on average. Compulsory metering, even with this tariff, would not appear to have the 








Table 3.3b:  Summary of effects of metering with existing Anglian Water tariff 
on water and sewerage bills of RV customers for different groups 

























-0.01 28%  17% 23% 32% 678 
£0-£10,000  +0.69  16%  20% 16% 48% 97 
£10,001-
£20,000 
-0.03 30%  14% 23% 33% 139 
£20,001-
£30,000 
-0.01 25%  20% 23% 32% 158 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-0.41 37%  18% 24% 21% 57 
> £80,000  +0.77  20%  28%  5%  47%  12 
 
There is of course no purpose in presenting a table 3.3c of the effects on already-
metered customers as they will all pay exactly the same as they do at present. 
 
It can be seen from Table 3.3b that RV households with incomes up to £10,000 on 
average gain quite substantially from a switch to metering, with nearly half gaining 
more than £1 per week. However, 16% lose more than £1 per week. It should be 
realised  that this 16% includes many of the most vulnerable households. Households 
with incomes up to £10,000 tend to be smaller (average size 2.05 people) than the 
average in the sample (2.95 people). Only 20% of the households with an income up 
to £10,000 have more than two people in them. Among the households in this income 
band, losers amount to only 8% of one person households (sample size 23), but 33% 
of two person households (sample size 54), 86% of three person households (sample 
size 14), and 50% of four person households (sample size 4). It is larger households 35 
that tend to lose out substantially. The average annual loss for households with 
incomes below £10,000 and more than two people is £77. By comparison, 46% of the 
households with an income of £10,001-£20,000 have more than two people. It is 
therefore not surprising that there are more losers in this income band, although they 
are balanced out by the gainers. A similar pattern is found in the £20,001-£30,000 
band. Households with incomes between £30,001-£40,000 and £40,001-£80,000 tend 
to lose out because they use more water. The very small number of households with 
incomes over £80,000 tend to gain as their water consumption is not as high as their 
very high rateable values. The number of such households in the sample is too small 
to draw any meaningful conclusions. 
 
The results in Tables 3.3a and 3.3b suggest that universal metering using a tariff 
designed like the one presently used by Anglian Water would be progressive overall. 
Not surprisingly, households that use more water would tend to pay more than they do 
at the moment. However, gainers and losers in all income groups are fairly evenly 
balanced, and in none of the income groups is the average change more than £1 per 
week, so that the overall redistributive effect between groups is not large. While the 
change would have a significant negative effect on some low-income households, 
overall low-income households would be better off by around £18 per year, and the 
charging regime would be less regressive than it is at the moment. Of course, if the 
metering led to reduced water use by the households consuming more water, this 
would be reflected in their bills and would reduce and perhaps eliminate their 
increased costs from the switch. The conclusion from this simulation is that such a 
switch would overall be strongly in the social and environmental interest.  
 
The rather surprisingly progressive result is partly explained by the fact that Anglian’s 
unmeasured tariff has quite a high standing charge. The combined water and sewerage 
bill of a customer with an RV of £300 is only 1.7 times the bill of a customer with an 
RV of £100 (OFWAT 2002). By contrast, the ratio for equivalent Severn Trent 
customers is 3. However, Severn Trent is unique in that it does not have a standing 
charge. The other companies do have a standing charge, but Anglian’s is one of the 
highest. A simulation later in this section examines the effect of the standing charge 
by switching on the basis of the Severn Trent tariff. 
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3.2.2  Tariffs varied by council tax band  
 
Initially, the project did not have available data that included Council Tax bands and 
had to rely on ACORN group data that, as noted above in connection with the 
OXERA research, is significantly less well correlated with income than Council Tax 
bands. 
 
Modelling of a wide range of different metering tariffs that varied both the fixed 
charge and a free allowance of water according to ACORN group did not find 
distribution with significantly fewer low-income losers than the standard Anglian 
Water tariff. The percentages of households in the income bands £0-£10,000 and 
£10,001-£20,000 that lost by more than £1 per week were found to be impossible to 
reduce by any significant amount. The reason is that there are many low-income 
households even in wealthier ACORN groups. ACORN does not identify poorer 
households with sufficient accuracy. 
 
A substantial amount of work was done for the project on the effects of varying tariffs 
according to rateable value, before Council Tax band data for the sample became 
available towards the end of this project. In fact, metered tariffs that vary according to 
rateable value would not be very practical to introduce because homes built or 
substantially modified since 1990 do not have rateable values. In any case, the work 
with RVs produced similar results to the work using tariffs that vary according to 
Council Tax bands described below. 
 










Table 3.4a  Council Tax Bands and the Values on which they are Based 
 
Valuation Band   Value at 1st of April 1991   Ratio to Band D  
A   Up to £40,000   6/9ths  
B  Over £40,000 and up to £52,000   7/9ths  
C   Over £52,000 and up to £68,000   8/9ths  
D   Over £68,000 and up to £88,000   1  
E   Over £88,000 and up to £120,000   11/9ths  
F   Over £120,000 and up to £160,000   13/9ths  
G   Over £160,000 and up to £320,000   15/9ths 
H   Over £320,000   18/9ths  
 
Table 3.4a shows that Council Tax is regressive. A Band H property is worth at least 
8 times as much a Band A property (and incomes between the top and bottom deciles 
vary by much more than this), but the Council Tax paid, which is calculated on the 
basis of the ratio of the band in question to Band D, as shown in Table 3.4a, is only 3 
times as much. In some of the simulations which follow it was therefore decided to 
use Council Tax bands, but ‘stretch’ them so that the amount paid was roughly 
proportional to the value of the property in 1991, in the manner of rateable values. 












Table  3.4b  Council Tax Bands and the ‘Stretched’ Ratios Used in Some 
Simulations 
 
Valuation Band   Value at 1st of April 1991  
‘Stretched’ Ratio to 
Band D  
A   Up to £40,000   30/78 
B  Over £40,000 and up to £52,000   46/78 
C   Over £52,000 and up to £68,000   60/78  
D   Over £68,000 and up to £88,000   78/78 
E   Over £88,000 and up to £120,000   104/78 
F   Over £120,000 and up to £160,000   140/78 
G   Over £160,000 and up to £320,000   240/78 
H   Over £320,000   400/78 
 
The standard Anglian tariff can be expressed by the formula: 
 
64 + 0.8144 x volume + 0.9688 x volume  (see Table 3.2) 
  (for water)  (for sewerage) 
 
There are two simple ways of varying the tariff according to Council Tax band: 
varying the volumetric rate or varying the standing charge. These are now examined 
in turn.  
 
3.2.2.1 Tariff varying volumetric charge by Council Tax band (Option 2) 
 
The first way of varying the metering charge analysed here is to keep the standing 
charge constant and vary the volumetric charge for water according to the formula: 
 
64+(Council Tax band ratio/average Council Tax band ratio  
x (0.8144 x volume + 0.9688 x volume)) 
        (for water)     (for sewerage) 
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Table 3.5a  Summary of effects of metering with the volumetric rate varying 
according to current Council Tax bands for different groups of 


























+0.00  20% 25% 30% 25% 1003 
£0-
£10,000 
+0.67  9%  18% 43% 30% 142 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.39  10% 14% 40% 26% 233 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+0.14  21% 21% 29% 29% 207 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-0.84  38% 29% 20% 13% 92 
> 
£80,000 
-1.33  46% 23% 9%  22% 18 
 
A large proportion of households appear to lose out with this tariff, but the losses of 
about half of the households losing less than £1 per week are trivial even for those on 
the lowest incomes – a few pence a week or a couple of pounds year. Only about 17% 
of low-income households lose more than a few pence a week. Households with 
incomes up to £30,000 a year are gainers on average, while households with incomes 








Table 3.5  Summary of effects of metering with the volumetric rate varying 
according to current Council Tax bands for different groups of RV 


























+0.30  23% 12% 20% 45% 505 
£0-
£10,000 
+1.14  17% 6%  19% 58% 69 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.71  14% 16% 20% 50% 110 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+0.51  21% 12% 21% 45% 118 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-0.94  45% 8%  19% 28% 41 
>  £80,000  -0.37  32% 14% 9%  45% 8 
 
A higher proportion of low-income households lose non-trivial sums (21%) than in 
the whole sample (17%), but the average weekly gain is +£1.14 rather than +£0.67 in 
the whole sample. The average annual loss for households with more than two people 
and an income of less than £10,000 a year is £35. 
 
Table 3.5c  Summary of effects of metering with the volumetric rate varying 
according to current Council Tax bands for different groups of 



























-0.29  17% 37% 42% 4%  498 
£0-
£10,000 
+0.23  2%  30% 63% 5%  73 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.09  8%  31% 56% 5%  123 
£20,001-
£30,000 
-0.35  21% 34% 38% 7%  89 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-0.75  34% 45% 21% 0%  41 
>  £80,000  -2.09  59% 24% 17% 0%  8 
 
The average annual gain for households with more than two people and an income of 
less than £10,000 a year is £32. 
 


















Table 3.6a  Summary of effects of metering with the volumetric rate varying 
according to stretched Council Tax bands for different groups of 


























+0.00  20% 20% 21% 39% 1003 
£0-
£10,000 
+1.09  6%  18% 29% 47% 142 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.81  12% 15% 27% 46% 233 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+0.36  20% 14% 22% 44% 207 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-1.40  39% 28% 11% 22% 92 
>  £80,000  -3.66  46% 12% 20% 22% 18 
 
Table 3.6a shows that 24% of low-income households lose out from this tariff. 
However, only about 12% lose more than a few pence a week. Households with 
incomes up to £30,000 are gainers on average. The result is that more households with 
incomes above this level lose on average. Those with incomes above £80,000 lose on 
average more than £1 per week. 
 
From Table 3.6b it can be seen that a higher proportion (10%) of low-income 
households lose more than £1 p.w. than in the whole sample (6%), but that as a group 
their average weekly gain is £1.76 p.w., compared with £1.09 p.w. for the whole 
sample. In addition, the average annual loss for RV households with more than two 
people and incomes below £10,000 is reduced to £3 (compared with a £63 loss for 
this group when the standing charge is varied by Council Tax band). 
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For the metered households the effects are reversed, with low-income households as a 
whole gaining less (only £0.46 p.w.) but only 4% now lose more £1 p.w. The big 
losers are now the richest households, 47% of which lose more than £2 p.w. The 
average gain for already metered households with more than two people and incomes 
below £10,000 is £56. 
 
Table 3.6b  Summary of effects of metering with the volumetric rate varying 
according to stretched Council Tax bands for different groups of 



























+0.64  16% 10% 15% 59% 505 
£0-
£10,000 
+1.76  10% 6%  10% 74% 69 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+1.46  7% 7% 18%  68%  110 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+1.13  12% 8%  18% 62% 118 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-1.46  40% 13% 8%  39% 41 








Table 3.6c  Summary of effects of metering with the volumetric rate varying 
according to stretched Council Tax bands for different groups of 



























-0.65  24% 30% 28% 18% 498 
£0-
£10,000 
+0.46  4%  28% 47% 21% 73 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.23  16% 22% 45% 27% 123 
£20,001-
£30,000 
-0.65  30% 25% 25% 20% 89 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-1.35  38% 40% 12% 10% 41 
>  £80,000  -5.30  61% 21% 18% 0%  8 
 
Comparing Option 3 (Table 3.6b) with Option 1 (Table 3.3) it can be seen that 
charging per litre of water with the rate varying according to Council Tax band is both 
more progressive overall (low-income households gain an average of £1.12 p.w. 
instead of £0.69), and results in fewer losing low-income households (25% as against 
36%), than metering according to the standard Anglian Water tariff (Option 1). 
Changing from the Anglian tariff to this variable tariff is also mildly beneficial for 
already metered low-income households, though it has a large negative effect on the 
richest households in this category. One of the implications of the variable tariff is 
that different households receive different marginal incentives for water conservation. 
That may not be a problem if the different marginal incentive is roughly proportional 
to income. If that is so it will mean that both rich and poor households feel an 
equivalent incentive to conserve water. 45 
However, there is a limit to how low the marginal price of water can be driven before 
any incentive effect is lost. Theoretically, the aim should be to make the marginal cost 
of water a similar proportion for each income group. In England as a whole, mean 
incomes of households in Council Tax band H (£59257) are about five times those of 
households in Council Tax band A (£12673). The ratio between mean incomes in 
Council Tax band G (£45520) and band A is about 3.5 times. However, such a 
comparison is not very meaningful because of the large variation in house prices 
across the country. Unfortunately, the sample size in the Family Expenditure Survey 
is not large enough to give meaningful results just for East Anglia or even the East of 
England for the higher Council Tax bands, but the incomes for the lower bands are 
very similar to national averages, so it may be presumed that there is a similar ratio. 
 
A possibility that has not been investigated here is that the ratio charged to different 
Council Tax bands could be varied to match the ratio of average incomes in each 
Council Tax band in a particular region. This would result in water charges in each 
region reflecting household income more closely, although the current substantial 
differences between water charges in different regions would remain. 
 
It may therefore be concluded from this analysis that metered tariffs that varied 
according to Council Tax bands (Options 2 and 3) would have greater benefits for 
low-income households than extending the existing Anglian Water metered tariff to 
unmetered households (Option 1), with the change in the volumetric charge being 
slightly more beneficial for these households than changing the standing charge. 
However, changing the standing charge rather than the volumetric charge lowers the 
losses for the upper income groups. 
 
3.2.2.3 Tariff varying standing charge by Council Tax band (Option 4) 
 
The first option examined under this heading is to keep the volumetric charge constant 





(66.50 xCouncil Tax band ratio/average Council Tax band ratio) + 
(0.8144 x volume + 0.9688 x volume)) 
        (for water)     (for sewerage) 
 
 
The slight increase in the standing charge is necessary in order to ensure revenue 




Table  3.7a  Summary of effects of metering with standing charge varying 
according to stretched Council Tax bands for different groups of 


























+0.00 19% 29% 32% 20% 1003 
£0-£10,000  +0.59 9%  21% 43% 27% 142 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.24 15% 24% 42% 19% 233 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+0.07 19% 28% 30% 23% 207 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-0.49 30% 40% 17% 13% 92 
>  £80,000  -0.55 48% 21% 18% 23% 18 
 
From Table 3.7a it can be seen that the distributional effect is similar to that for the 
standard tariff (Option 1, see Table 3.3) and is clearly progressive. 70% of low-
income households are better off from the switch, and only 9% are losers by more 
than £1 p.w. (compared with 16% in the Anglian tariff case). The stretched Council 47 
Tax bands have also removed the small gains for the richest households shown in 
Table 3.3. Moreover, households in the £10,001-£30,000 income range are also net 
gainers (unlike in Table 3.3), and in all income bands except the richest there are 
fewer households that lose more than £1 p.w. 
 
Table 3.7b shows that the main impact of the tariff is on previously unmetered 
households. For them on average the tariff is progressive. Most low-income 
households gain and more gain by more than £1 p.w., but 18% lose by more than £1 
p.w. Moreover, as noted above, most low-income households are small. The average 
loss for unmetered households with more than two people and incomes below £10,000 
is £63, compared to £77 under the standard Anglian tariff. 
 
Table 3.7c shows that this tariff is also progressive among metered customers, with a 
small gain for 68% of poor households, while very few poor households (only 3%) 
lose out by more than £1 p.w. Moreover, in contrast to the RV households, already 
metered households with more than two people and incomes below £10,000 


















Table  3.7b  Summary of effects of metering with standing charge varying 
according to stretched Council Tax bands for different groups of 


























+0.13 26% 16% 19% 39% 505 
£0-£10,000  +0.93 18% 9%  18% 55% 69 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.37 23% 17% 20% 40% 110 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+0.22 23% 17% 20% 40% 118 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-0.60 40% 17% 14% 29% 41 
















Table  3.7c  Summary of effects of metering with standing charge varying 
according to stretched Council Tax bands for different groups of 



























-0.13  12%  42% 46% 0%  498 
£0-
£10,000 
+0.26  3%  29% 68% 0%  73 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.12  8%  30% 62% 0%  123 
£20,001-
£30,000 
-0.14  13%  41% 46% 0%  89 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-0.40  23%  56% 21% 0%  41 
>  £80,000  -1.07  55%  17% 18% 0%  8 
 
 
3.2.3  Per capita lifeline allowance 
 
3.2.3.1 Lifeline allowance per capita with increased volumetric charge (Option 5) 
 
A way that has been proposed to avoid negative impacts on larger households would 
be to have a per capita (or per adult and per child) lifeline allowance of water 
available at a fixed rate. The research then modelled the distributional impact of 
introducing the Flemish tariff, which provides a lifeline allowance of 15 m
3 per capita. 
A tariff was tested that achieved revenue neutrality by increasing the standing charge 
compared to that currently applying to metered customers, although less than the 
current standing charge for RV customers, but it was found to lead to most low-50 
income customers losing. A more progressive result was obtained if the price of each 
litre of water above the allowance was increased and the standing charge for metered 
customers was kept at the existing level of £64.  
 
Table 3.8a  Summary of effects of metering with a lifeline allowance of 15 m
3 
per capita and an increased price per litre of water for different 

























+0.00 17%  24% 36% 23% 1307 
£0-£10,000  +0.31  12%  23% 42% 23% 200 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.01  15%  28% 36% 21% 281 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+0.07  19%  22% 30% 29% 264 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-0.28 25%  22% 34% 19% 119 
>  £80,000  +0.36  24%  14% 36% 26% 24 
 
Table 3.8a shows that this tariff is positive overall for all households with incomes 
below £30,000. A minority of low-income households lose out under this tariff (35%), 
but this is significantly more than under the options where the volumetric rate varies 
according to Council Tax bands (see Tables 3.5a and 3.6a). On the other hand the 
tariff benefits a majority of households in all income groups except the very highest. 
Moreover, fewer households lose more than £1 p.w., and in no income group do more 
than 25% of households lose this amount, much lower than in the worst affected 
income groups in the previous options. This option is therefore less redistributive 
between income groups, with the maximum average gain or loss being £0.36 p.w., 
compared to £1.33 p.w., £3.66 p.w. and £0.55 p.w. in the previous options. This tariff 51 
might therefore attract less political opposition from higher income groups than the 
previous options.  
 
The tariff is, however, considerably worse than the tariffs that varied the volumetric 
charge according to Council Tax band for low-income RV households. 41% of all RV 
households with income below £10,000 lose out (see Table 3.8b in Annex 1), and the 
average loss of those with more than two people and incomes below £10,000 is £57. 
On the other hand, with this tariff all income groups in already metered households 
gain on average (see Table 3.8c in Annex 1), and the average gain for those with more 
than two people and incomes below £10,000 is £20. 
 
This tariff is therefore not as progressive as those that vary either the standing charge 
or the volumetric rate according to Council Tax (Options 2, 3 and 4), but it also 
produces far fewer significant losers in higher income groups. 
 
3.2.3.2  Lifeline allowance for one adult and each child with increased volumetric 
charge (Option 6) 
 
There would be practical difficulties in introducing a per capita tariff in the absence of 
a UK population register (there is already a national identity card in Belgium). The 
research next explored the distributional impact of Paul Herrington’s proposal for an 
allowance of 20 m
3 per capita for the first adult and each child (administered using the 
child benefit register). Note that 20 m
3 is the average amount of water used by a child 











Table 3.9a  Summary of effects of metering with a lifeline allowance of 20 m
3 
per capita for the first adult and each child and an increased price 
per litre of water for different groups of households assuming no 

























0.00  19%  24% 32% 25% 1307 
£0-£10,000  +0.39  11%  18% 45% 26% 200 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.08  15%  26% 37% 22% 281 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+0.05  23%  21% 29% 31% 264 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-0.44 26%  32% 22% 20% 119 
>  £80,000  +0.32  25%  17% 26% 32% 24 
 
Table 3.9a shows that that the distributional impact of Option 5 is progressive overall 
and is similar in this respect to the preceding option (Table 3.8a), although 39% of 
low-income households now lose out (compared to 35%) and the maximum loss or 
gain is now £0.55 (compared to £0.36) p.w. The impact on low-income RV 
households (Table 3.9b in Annex 1) is also similar to that of the standard Anglian 
tariff (Option 1, Table 3.3). It is less progressive than the three options that vary a 
metered tariff according to Council Tax band (Options 2, 3 and 4; Tables 3.5a, 3.6a 
and 3.7a), though the maximum losses and gains of these options are greater, so that 
the the same considerations apply as discussed for the previous option.  
 
The average loss for RV households with more than two people and incomes below 
£10,000 is £57, the same as for the preceding option. The average gain for households 
with more than two people and incomes below £10,000 is £26. 
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It therefore makes little difference whether there is an allowance of 15  m
3 per 
individual (Option 5) or an allowance of 20 m
3 for the first adult and each child 
(Option 6), although Option 6 would currently be easier technically to implement in 
the UK. Both options are progressive overall and lead to limited redistributive effects. 
The options which vary the charge by Council Tax band (Options 2, 3 and 4) are 
better for low-income households but are more redistributive. The two kinds of 
metering tariff therefore have different political implications and offer different 
political options. 
 
3.2.3.3 Tariff varying water allowance by Council Tax band (Option 7) 
 
A third way of implementing the lifeline allowance idea would be to provide a free 
allowance of water (say 120m
3 per annum) that tapers off as the Council Tax band 
increases. There are two ways to make the measure revenue neutral, either by 
increasing the standing charge or by increasing the volumetric charge. It was found 
that increasing the standing charge inevitably led to losses for a large proportion of 
low-income customers. It was found that such a result could be avoided if the 
volumetric charge was increased according to the following formula: 
 
64 + 1.61 x (0.8144 x (volume – allowance) + 0.9688 x (volume – allowance)) 
 
where the allowance varied according to the schedule set out in Table 3.9. 
 
Table 3.10  Varying the Water Allowance by Council Tax Band 









H 0 54 
 
 
The allowance tapers off up to Band D. Trial and error showed that a long taper is 
better for low-income households than a shorter taper, but that, as would be expected, 
this effect wears off as the taper reaches into the most valuable homes.  
 
Table  3.11a  Summary of effects of metering with an allowance varying 
according to Council Tax band for different groups of households 

























+0.00 33%  12% 14% 41% 1003 
£0-£10,000  +1.48  13%  4%  20% 63% 142 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.79  20%  14% 16% 50% 233 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+0.06  33%  12% 12% 43% 207 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-1.89 58%  13% 14% 15% 92 
>  £80,000  -1.55 50%  15% 19% 16% 18 
 
Table 3.11a shows that under Option 7 only 17% of low-income households lose out. 
63% of low-income households gain more than £1 p.w., meaning that on average 
overall low-income households gain quite substantially. On the other hand, 50% or 
more households with incomes higher than £40,000 lose more than £1 p.w. 
 
The average outcomes for low-income households are good, but because extreme 
gains and losses tend to be of a higher magnitude the average loss for RV households 
with more than two people and incomes below £10,000 is £76, which is almost 
exactly the same as for the standard Anglian tariff. On the other hand, this tariff is 55 
good for 88% of low-income metered households (see Table 3.11c). The average gain 
for metered households with more than two people and incomes below £10,000 is 
£20. 
 
Thus this tariff is progressive overall, and many low-income households gain 
substantially, but it is costly for larger low-income RV households. Also, because of 
the tendency of the tariff to exaggerate gains and losses, some higher income 
households have very large losses. 
 
3.2.4 Lifeline allowance and volumetric charge varying by council tax 
band ratio  
 
Looking at all the options so far, two options stand out as having a better effect on 
low-income households than the others: varying the volumetric charge according to 
stretched Council Tax band (Option 3) or an allowance of water included in the 
standing charge according to Council Tax band (Option 7). The next simulation looks 
at the effect of combining these options.  
 
3.2.4.1  Tariff with both lifeline allowance and volumetric charge varying by 
‘stretched’ Council Tax band ratio (Option 8) 
 
This simulation varies both the lifeline allowance and the volumetric charge according 
to the Council Tax band ratio. 
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Table 3.12a  Summary of effects of metering with an allowance and the variable 
charge varying according to stretched Council Tax band ratios for 


























+0.00 24%  10% 12% 54% 941 
£0-£10,000 +2.20  10%  4%  9%  77%  121 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+1.49  14%  9%  11% 66% 209 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+0.54 21%  10%  9%  60%  202 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-2.55 42%  18% 10% 30% 91 
>  £80,000  -6.12 49%  6%  12% 33% 17 
 
Table 3.12a shows that Option 8 is the most progressive of those so far explored, with 
77% of low-income households gaining more than £1 p.w., and the average for this 
group being more that £2 p.w. However, the highest income group loses on average 
over £6 p.w., and the losses for the greatest losers are well over £1000. The greatest 
losses among households on low incomes are also large – up to £350. 
 
The average gain for RV households with more than two people and an income below 
£10,000 is £20. However, because of the exaggeration of gains and losses with this 
tariff, some households lose a great deal, including some low-income households. The 
average gain for metered households with more than two people and an income below 
£10,000 is £91, but the losses among some households, even ones with quite low 
incomes, are enormous, while the average loss of the richest income group is over £9 
p.w. (see Table 3.12c in Annex 1). 
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The gains and losses are exaggerated because stretched Council Tax band ratios are 
being used for both factors in the tariff. The next simulation looks at the effects of just 
varying the volumetric charge 
 
3.2.4.2  Tariff with lifeline allowance and only volumetric charge varying by 
‘stretched’ Council Tax band ratio (Option 9) 
 
This simulation combines the ideas of variable charging according to Council Tax 
band and an allowance of 20 m
3 for the first adult and each child. 
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Table 3.13a  Summary of effects of metering with a lifeline allowance and the 
charge per litre of water varying according to stretched Council 
Tax band ratios for different groups of households assuming no 

























+0.00 21%  12% 24% 43% 1002 
£0-£10,000  +1.16  8%  6%  35% 51% 142 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.93  11%  13% 27% 49% 233 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+0.41  19%  12% 19% 50% 207 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-1.62 45%  15% 18% 22% 91 
>  £80,000  -3.91 46%  8%  25% 21% 18 
 
Table 3.13a shows that on average households with incomes up to £30,000 gain from 
Option 9. Moreover, fewer households in these income groups than under any other 
option end up as losers (only 14% of the poorest households). However, the option 
also leads to very large losses for some households that use a great deal of water. One 
per cent of low-income households lose around £200 a year. 
 
The average loss for RV households with more than two people and an income below 
£10,000 is only £8. But losses under this tariff are up to £1000 per year for some 
households, both metered and RV (average losses for the richest metered households 
is £6 p.w. – See Table 3.13c in Annex 1). The average gain for metered households 
with more than two people and incomes of less than £10,000 a year is £69. 
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A similar tariff (not showm) that in addition varied the standing charge by Council 
Tax band was modelled. It gave a very similar distributional effect, but the extreme 
gains and losses were slightly amplified. 
 
3.2.4.3 Tariff with lifeline allowance and only volumetric charge varying by current 
Council Tax band ratio (Option 10) 
 
One way to reduce the magnitude of the gains and losses would be not to stretch the 
Council Tax band ratios, but use the current ratios. Option 10 examines the effects of 
this tariff. 
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Table 3.14a  Summary of effects of metering with a lifeline allowance and the 
charge per litre of water varying according to current Council Tax 
band ratios for different groups of households assuming no 

























-0.00 24%  15% 32% 29% 1002 
£0-£10,000  +0.72  12%  7%  49% 32% 142 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.50  13%  20% 37% 30% 233 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+0.17  23%  16% 24% 37% 207 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-1.11 47%  17% 17% 19% 91 
>  £80,000  -1.59 49%  12% 19% 20% 18 
 
Table 3.14a shows that under Option 10 the percentages of gainers and losers are 
similar to Option 9 (the tariff with stretched Council Tax band ratios). Rather more 
low-income households lose more than £1 p.w. (12% as against 8%), and overall it is 
less progressive (low-income households gain £0.72 p.w. on average, as against £1.16 
p.w. The richest income group now loses £1.59 on average (as against £3.91). The 
largest losses are reduced from around £1000 to around £500, but it makes very little 
difference to the magnitude of the biggest losses among low-income households, 
which remain at about £200. The average loss for RV households with more than two 
people and an income below £10,000 rises to £58. Attempting to reduce the maximum 
losses has increased the average amount that larger low-income households have to 
pay. The average gain for metered households with more than two people and an 
income below £10,000 is £45. 
 61 
A final simulation (Option 11) modelled OXERA’s idea of combining a standing 
charge varying according to Council Tax band and an allowance varying according to 
Council Tax band. It was found that the tariff of Option 11 is progressive, but creates 
more low-income losers than the comparable one varying the charge per unit of water 
by Council Tax band (Option 9) and far more lose more than £1 per week (18% as 
opposed to 8% - see Table 3.15a in Annex 1, and Table 3.13a). The average losses of 
the richest households are lower (£1.86 as against £3.91 p.w.), as are their greatest 
losses, at about £600. The average loss for RV households with more than two people 
and an income below £10,000 is £35. The average gain for households with more than 
two people and an income below £10 is £42. Because this option offers little new, all 
the tables relating to it (Tables 3.15a,b,c) have been placed in Annex 1. 
 
3.2.5  Severn Trent Tariff 
 
The high existing standing charges under the present Anglian Water tariffs seem to 
make it easier to find a way to adjust proposed metered tariffs to avoid costing those 
on lower incomes more. Other water companies have lower standing charges than 
Anglian, while Severn Trent actually has no standing charge for unmeasured 
customers, although there are standing charges for metered customers. The next 
simulation examines the effect of metering if the customers in the Anglian Water 
SoDCon monitor were instead Severn Trent customers. Conveniently for comparison, 
the average rateable value of SoDCon customers (£199) is very close to the average 
rateable value of Severn Trent customers (£192). Severn Trent has eight tariff zones. 
The calculations below are based on Zone 4, which has a tariff which gives charges 
very close to the average charge across the entire Severn Trent region. 
 







Table 3.16  Severn Trent Water Zone 4 tariffs (£) for April 2002 – March 2003 
 
   Water  Sewerage 
Unmeasured       
Standing charge  0  0 
RV multiplier  0.5863  0.5290 
       
Measured       
Standing charge  16.68  8.40 
Volumetric 
charge/m3  0.7077 0.4820 
 
In addition, metered customers (but not unmeasured ones) pay a property-based fixed 
charge for surface water drainage of £15.72 for a flat or terrace, £31.44 for a semi-
detached and £47.16 for a detached house. 
 
Table 3.17  Summary of effects of metering with existing Severn Trent Zone 4 
tariff on water and sewerage bills for different groups of RV 
























-0.33 32%  26% 22% 20% 678 
£0-£10,000  -0.07 26%  22% 32% 20% 97 
£10,001-
£20,000 
-0.52 36%  27% 21% 16% 139 
£20,001-
£30,000 
-0.32 29%  27% 24% 20% 158 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-0.20 36%  20% 21% 23% 57 
>  £80,000  +0.90  25%  5%  25% 45% 12 
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All classes of customers lose out on average, except for those with incomes over £80k 
per year. For households with an income below £10,000 the average loss is very small 
(£0.07 p.w.), but the average loss for these households with more than two people is 
£76 per year. This means that moves to metering in regions that have low standing 
charges will need to involve some of the progressive tariff options modelled above, if 
the tariff structure in those regions is not to be made more regressive. 
 
The final simulation looks at the effect of implementing on Severn Trent customers a 
tariff with a lifeline allowance of 20 m
3 for the first adult and each child and the 
charge per litre of water varying according to stretched Council Tax band ratios 
(Option 9 in the simulations above).  
 
Table 3.18a shows that the outcome is almost as progressive as the equivalent Anglian 
Water tariff (Option 9, Table 3.13a), with an average gain in low-income households 
of £0.98 (compared to £1.16), and a similarly low proportion of low-income losers 
(16% compared with 14%). The average loss for households with an income under 
£10,000 per year and more than two people is £8, which is also the same as in Option 
9. The average gain for households with an income under £10,000 per year and more 
than two people is £43 (compared to £69 under Option 9). These results show that the 
results obtained based on changes to the Anglian Water tariff are not simply an 
artefact of Anglian’s high standing charges. Similar results are obtained when Severn 
Trent’s tariff is used instead. This suggests that it should be possible to design a 
metering tariff in other regions which is progressive overall and results in a low 











Table 3.18a  Summary of effects of change from existing Severn Trent tariff to 
metering with a lifeline allowance and the charge per litre of water 
varying according to stretched Council Tax band ratios for 

























+0.00 20%  14% 27% 39% 972 
£0-£10,000  +0.98  8%  8%  34% 50% 135 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.70  10%  16% 29% 45% 225 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+0.32  17%  15% 36% 42% 202 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-1.20 44%  16% 16% 24% 88 




Section 3.1 identified the three factors that, from a political point of view, need to be 
taken into account in designing a tariff based on universal metering as the overall 
regressivity of the charging system (factor 1); the negative impacts on individual, 
high-water-using low-income households (factor 2); and the degree of redistribution 
(from richer to poorer households) that is required to reduce the first two factors 
(factor 3). Table 4.1 sets out a number of the results that reflect these factors from the 
different options that have been investigated in respect of the Anglian Water 
customers. The key results that have been chosen for this comparison are: 
•  Whether on average low-income (<£10,000 p.a.) households are better or 
worse off with the relevant charging option than with the present Anglian 65 
Water charging system (if on average they are better off then the new tariff is 
less regressive overall for these households than the present system) 
•  Whether on average medium low-income (£20,000>income>£10,000 p.a.) 
households are better or worse off with the relevant charging option than with 
the present Anglian Water charging system (this result is also relevant to the 
overall regressivity of the present system) 
•  The proportion of low-income households that is worse off by more than £1 
p.w. (this may be taken to reflect the impact of the new system on high-water-
using low-income households) 
•  The proportion of medium low-income households that is worse off by more 
than £1 p.w. (this may be taken to reflect the impact of the new system on 
high-water-using medium low-income households) 
•  The extent to which on average higher income (>£40,000 p.a.) households are 
made worse off by the relevant charging option (this is a measure of the 
redistribution from richer to poorer households that has taken place) 
•  The proportion of higher income (>£40,000 p.a.) households that is worse off 
by more than £1 p.w. (this results shows the level of the impact of the relevant 
charging option on the higher-water-using richer households) 
 
The various options are set out again below for convenience. It should be noted that 
the results quoted are for both currently metered and RV Anglian customers, apart 
from Option 1. All results assume that there has been no demand reduction as a result 
of metering. 
 
Option 1:  Metering with existing Anglian Water tariff for (RV customers only, 
no effect on existing metered customers) 
Option 2:  Metering with the volumetric rate varying according to current Council 
Tax bands  
Option 3:  Metering with the volumetric rate varying according to stretched 
Council Tax bands  
Option 4:  Metering with standing charge varying according to stretched Council 
Tax bands 66 
Option 5:  Metering with a lifeline allowance of 15 m
3 per capita and an increased 
price per litre of water 
Option 6:  Metering with a lifeline allowance of 20 m
3 per capita for the first adult 
and each child and an increased price per litre of water 
Option 7:  Metering with an allowance varying according to Council Tax band 
Option 8:  Metering with an allowance and the variable charge varying according 
to stretched Council Tax band ratios 
Option 9:  Metering with a lifeline allowance and the charge per litre of water 
varying according to stretched Council Tax band ratios 
Option 10:  Metering with a lifeline allowance and the charge per litre of water 
varying according to current Council Tax band ratios 
Option 11:  Metering with standing charge and allowance varying according to 
Council Tax band  
 
Firstly, from Table 4.1 it can be seen that all the investigated options are progressive 
from the point of view of the lowest-income households, and all but one (Option 1) is 
also progressive for the next income group (those with incomes of £10-20,000). 
Moreover, the fact that this result was replicated in the option that used the Severn 
Trent rather than the Anglian Water tariff shows that the result was not a function of 
the structure of the Anglian tariff. It is likely to hold across all water customers, 
whatever their water company. There is therefore no basis for supposing for switching 
to metering will, on average, make low-income households worse off. All the options 
investigated actually make them better off on average, some quite substantially so. In 
view of the fact that current water charging systems are generally regressive, many 










Table 4.1 Comparison of Results from Various Metering Tariff Options 
 
























Option 1  +0.34  8%  -0.02  15%  -0.09  17% 
Option 2  +0.67  9%  +0.39  10%  -0.14  21% 
Option 3  +1.09  6%  +0.81  12%  +0.36  37% 
Option 4  +0.59  9%  +0.24  15%  -0.50  33% 
Option  5  +0.31  12% +0.01  15% -0.17  25% 
Option  6  +0.39  11% +0.08  15% -0.31  26% 
Option  7  +1.48  13% +0.79  20% -1.83  57% 
Option  8  +2.20  10% +1.49  14% -3.11  43% 
Option 9  +1.16  8%  +0.93  11%  -2.00  45% 
Option  10  +0.72  12% +0.50  13% -1.19  47% 
Option  11  +1.57  18% +0.81  23% -1.69  55% 
 
Secondly, there is no tariff which does not make 6% or more of the lowest-income 
households worse off by more than £1 p.w. These will tend to be the highest water-
consuming households in this income group. For some of them, their high water use 
will reflect discretionary rather than essential use, and a cutback in that use would 
reduce these extra charges they would pay under metering (Options 5-11 include a 
lifeline allowance, to reduce the likelihood of cutbacks on essential water use). Where 
their high water use is essential, this is likely to be due to medical reasons, and it 
should be possible to make special arrangements. This already happens to some extent 
with the Government’s vulnerable groups scheme (DEFRA 2003) which caps the bills 
of those identified as having high essential water use, and efforts could be made to 
boost the take up of the scheme by those who are entitled to its benefits. In these two 
ways, it is likely that the great majority of low-income households would be able to 
reduce any extra charges they would face under the metering tariffs. 68 
 
Thirdly, the tariffs vary considerably in the degree of redistribution from richer to 
poorer which they bring about (as noted above, all are redistributive in this direction 
to some extent). The least redistributive is Option 5, whereby the average cost to the 
richest households is only £0.17 p.w., and only 25% lose more than £1 p.w. 
 
Which of these tariff options is ‘best’ depends on political perspective. Option 3 
(volumetric rate varying according to stretched Council Tax bands) leaves fewest 
households in the two lowest income groups worse off by over £1 p.w. Option 8 
(lifeline allowance and the charge per litre of water varying according to stretched 
Council Tax band ratios) is very similar in this respect, but is substantially more 
redistributive from richer to poorer households. Option 4 (standing charge varying 
according to stretched Council Tax bands) is also similar in this respect, but is less 
redistributive. Option 5 (a lifeline allowance of 20 m
3 per capita for the first adult and 
each child and an increased price per litre of water) is least redistributive, as noted 
above, but leaves more low-income households with extra bills in excess of £1 p.w. 
(12% as opposed to 8% for the lowest income group).  
 
Finally it should be noted that the whole sample comparisons above conceal 
systematic differences between the impacts of the tariffs on RV and on already-
metered water customers. In general the impacts on low-income RV customers are 
less positive (or more negative), and those on already-metered customers are more 
positive (or less negative), than the whole sample average. This is because already-
metered customers are less affected by the changes to the metering tariff, but still get 
the full benefit of any compensatory measures (e.g. lifeline allowance or ‘stretched’ 
Council Tax band ratios) that may be introduced as part of the tariff. 
 
It is hoped that, should universal metering be adopted in the UK, in some regions or 
as a whole, such detailed tariff design issues will get adequate consideration, so that 
the change does not have social effects which were not intended. 
 
Finally, it may be noted that it would be possible to introduce a tariff with a surcharge 
for significantly greater water use in summer, when water is most scarce and when 
some people use large quantities of water for their gardens, which may be classed a 69 
discretionary rather than an essential use. The OXERA study suggested that such a 
modification of a tariff would have both environmental and distributional merits. 
Unfortunately, it was too difficult to model here. However, it may be worth 


































Table 3.8b  Summary of effects of metering with a lifeline allowance of 15 m
3 
per capita and an increased price per litre of water for different 


























-0.13 30%  16% 18% 36% 678 
£0-£10,000  +0.44  23%  18% 14% 45% 97 
£10,001-
£20,000 
-0.16 28%  20% 18% 34% 139 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+0.08  27%  13% 17% 43% 158 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-0.67 43%  8%  18% 31% 57 










Table 3.8c  Summary of effects of metering with a lifeline allowance of 15 m
3 
per capita and an increased price per litre of water for different 


























+0.16 4%  22% 55% 9%  629 
£0-£10,000 +0.18  2%  27%  69%  2%  103 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.17 2%  37%  52%  9%  142 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+0.06 7%  34%  50%  9%  106 
£30,001-
£40,000 




+0.07 7%  36%  48%  9%  62 
















Table 3.9b  Summary of effects of metering with a lifeline allowance of 20 m
3 
per capita for the first adult and each child and an increased price 
per litre of water for different groups of RV customer households 

























-0.18 33%  14% 18% 35% 678 
£0-£10,000  +0.51  21%  18% 14% 47% 97 
£10,001-
£20,000 
-0.07 30%  17% 19% 34% 139 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+0.03  33%  11% 14% 42% 158 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-1.00 47%  14% 15% 24% 57 
















Table 3.9c:  Summary of effects of metering with a lifeline allowance of 20 m
3 
per capita for the first adult and each child and an increased price 
per litre of water for different groups of metered households 

























+0.19 5%  34% 48% 13% 629 
£0-£10,000 +0.28  2%  18%  73%  7%  103 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.22  2%  34% 52% 12% 142 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+0.09  8%  36% 42% 14% 106 
£30,001-
£40,000 




+0.07  9%  47% 27% 17% 62 
















Table  3.11b  Summary of effects of metering with an allowance varying 
according to Council Tax band for different groups of RV 


























+0.16  31%  11% 11% 47% 505 
£0-
£10,000 
+1.88  17% 6% 7% 70%  69 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+1.01  20%  14% 14% 52% 110 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+0.31  28%  13% 10% 49% 118 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-2.39  57%  9%  10% 24% 41 















Table  3.11c  Summary of effects of metering with an allowance varying 
according to Council Tax band for different groups of metered 


























-0.15  34%  13% 17% 36% 498 
£0-
£10,000 
+1.10  10%  2%  32% 56% 73 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.60  20%  14% 17% 49% 123 
£20,001-
£30,000 
-0.27  40%  11% 12% 37% 89 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-1.48  60%  14% 18% 8%  41 















Table 3.12b  Summary of effects of metering with an allowance and the variable 
charge varying according to stretched Council Tax band ratios for 


























+0.90 18%  8%  9%  65% 491 
£0-£10,000 +2.76  11%  2%  5%  82%  66 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+2.23 9%  10%  5%  76%  104 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+1.64  11%  9%  10% 70% 116 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-2.72 44%  10% 8%  38% 41 
















Table 3.12c  Summary of effects of metering with an allowance and the variable 
charge varying according to stretched Council Tax band ratios for 
different groups of metered households assuming no demand 

























-0.96 31%  11% 15% 43% 450 
£0-£10,000  +1.54  11%  4%  16% 69% 55 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.76  20%  7%  17% 56% 105 
£20,001-
£30,000 
-0.93 35%  10% 10% 45% 86 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-2.41 41%  24% 13% 22% 50 
















Table 3.13b  Summary of effects of metering with a lifeline allowance and the 
charge per litre of water varying according to stretched Council 
Tax band ratios for different groups of RV households assuming 

























+0.54 20%  8%  15% 57% 505 
£0-£10,000 +1.62  13%  7%  9%  71%  69 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+1.46  8%  10% 18% 64% 110 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+1.21  13%  10% 12% 65% 118 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-1.94 53%  5%  12% 30% 41 
















Table 3.13c  Summary of effects of metering with a lifeline allowance and the 
charge per litre of water varying according to stretched Council 
Tax band for different groups of metered households assuming no 

























-0.53 23%  14% 35% 28% 497 
£0-£10,000  +0.73  5%  5%  59% 31% 73 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.45  14%  16% 34% 36% 123 
£20,001-
£30,000 
-0.65 27%  15% 27% 31% 89 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-1.36 39%  22% 22% 17% 50 
















Table 3.14b  Summary of effects of metering with a lifeline allowance and the 
charge per litre of water varying according to current Council Tax 
band ratios for different groups of RV households assuming no 

























+0.14 27%  13% 17% 43% 505 
£0-£10,000  +0.92  21%  7%  14% 58% 69 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.69  17%  16% 23% 44% 110 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+0.54  23%  12% 17% 48% 118 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-1.52 53%  12% 12% 23% 41 
















Table 3.14c  Summary of effects of metering with an a lifeline allowance and 
the charge per litre of water varying according to Council Tax 
band for different groups of metered households assuming no 

























-0.16 21%  18% 46% 15% 497 
£0-£10,000 +0.53  4%  7%  82%  7%  73 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.32  10%  23% 51% 16% 123 
£20,001-
£30,000 
-0.32 24%  20% 34% 22% 89 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-0.78 41%  21% 22% 16% 50 
















Table  3.15a  Summary of effects of metering with a standing charge and 
allowance varying according to stretched Council Tax band ratios 


























-0.00 34%  12% 13% 41% 859 
£0-£10,000  +1.57  18%  4%  13% 65% 96 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.81  23%  12% 17% 48% 180 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+0.26  30%  13% 10% 47% 189 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-1.66 56%  12% 14% 18% 90 
















Table  3.15b  Summary of effects of metering with standing charge and 
allowance varying according to Council Tax band for different 


























+0.32 30%  9%  13% 48% 454 
£0-£10,000 +1.80  21%  5%  6%  68%  52 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+1.17  17%  10% 19% 54% 94 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+0.72  22%  13% 11% 54% 112 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-1.91 55%  7%  12% 26% 41 
















Table  3.15c  Summary of effects of metering with standing charge and 
allowance varying according to Council Tax band for different 


























-0.37 39%  15% 13% 33% 405 
£0-£10,000  +1.29  15%  4%  20% 61% 44 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.42  28%  16% 14% 42% 86 
£20,001-
£30,000 
-0.41 41%  14% 10% 35% 77 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-1.45 56%  17% 15% 12% 49 















Table 3.18b  Summary of effects of change from existing Severn Trent tariff to 
metering with a lifeline allowance and the charge per litre of water 
varying according to stretched Council Tax band ratios for 

























+0.51 17%  12% 29% 52% 498 
£0-£10,000  +1.21  12%  9%  15% 64% 69 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+1.03  8%  13% 23% 56% 107 
£20,001-
£30,000 
+1.04  11%  13% 22% 54% 115 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-0.96 44%  10% 11% 35% 41 
















Table  3.18c  Summary of effects of change from existing Severn Trent 
unmeasured tariff to metering with a lifeline allowance and the 
charge per litre of water varying according to stretched Council 
Tax band ratios for different groups of metered households 

























-0.52 23%  16% 35% 26% 474 
£0-£10,000  +0.74  5%  7%  52% 36% 66 
£10,001-
£20,000 
+0.39  12%  18% 34% 36% 118 
£20,001-
£30,000 
-0.62 26%  17% 32% 25% 87 
£30,001-
£40,000 




-1.41 44%  21% 20% 15% 47 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 The authors wish to thank Anglian Water for making the data available, and particularly Amy Walters 
for her assistance with the data. 
ii ACORN stands for ‘A Classification of Residential Neighbourhoods’. The marketing data firm CACI 
has produced this classification to include every street in the country, fitting them into 17 distinct 
Groups, which, in turn, contain 54 ‘typical’ ACORN neighbourhood categories. The basic idea is that 
streets of broadly similar people are grouped together. A postcode is assigned to the type which is the 
best match with the unique characteristics of the street, based on Census data. The descriptions of the 
types are based on averages across all streets in the type. The match is not necessarily particularly 
close. 